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Abstract  
Liberal internationalism is under the microscope as never before as the world experiences 
turbulence and anxiety. The spectre of right-wing authoritarianism and even fascism haunts 
western societies as struggles for recognition dominate domestic politics, while demands of 
(re)emerging states for international representation grow more compelling. Simultaneously, 
there is broader recognition of a growing legitimacy crisis of the American hegemon 
principally due to the mindsets and failures of its liberal hegemonic elites. Both developments 
are major advances in understanding how the West dominates ‘diversity regimes’ or co-opts 
discourses universal in origin and character, and of how the US foreign establishment has 
brought the world to the current conjuncture. Yet, there are limitations still. Although central, 
the concepts of diversity, hierarchy, and elites, need to be broadened out significantly, and 
rooted in corporate-class power, to fully comprehend the core crises of international order 
today.     
Key words: diversity regime; hierarchy; elites; organic intellectuals; ultraimperialism; class; 
class inequality; western hegemony; liberal order; Koch Foundation 
 
It is not an easy time for liberal internationalism. In both the political and academic worlds, 
liberal internationalism is under the microscope as never before.1 The “end of history” 
proclamation of the late 1980s and the threat of a (boring) world with no major ideological 
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divisions has not come to pass. On the contrary, the world is experiencing turbulence and 
anxiety. Unorthodox political and ideological forces are increasingly significant across the 
world, and the specter of right-wing authoritarianism and even fascism haunts Western 
societies. Intertwined with the above, there are greater demands for recognition. The politics 
of identity, for example, has come to dominate domestic politics in multicultural Europe and 
the United States, while the demands of (re)emerging states such as China and India for 
international-institutional representation commensurate with their powers grow more 
compelling. Such concerns had motivated Samuel Huntington’s controversial ‘clash of 
civilizations’ thesis at the very beginning of the post-Cold war era, which reads, in the age of 
Trump, as somewhat chilling. And in the post-9-11 era, Walter Russell Mead extolled the 
virtues of the cultural affinities and world-order-making superiorities of (racio-cultural) 
Anglo-Saxons.2  
The demand for diversity is preoccupying leading minds in the International Relations 
(IR) discipline, including but not limited to Amitav Acharya and Christian Reus-Smit, whose 
recent books are under consideration here. So, too, is the growing crisis of legitimacy of the 
American liberal hegemon and the hierarchies it generated, especially due to the mindsets, 
entrenchment, and failures of its dominant foreign policy elites.3  The resultant literature has 
led to major advances in understanding on the one hand of how the West dominates so-called 
“diversity regimes” (Reus-Smit) and co-opts the IR discourse (Acharya), and on the other 
hand of how the U.S. foreign policy establishment, wedded to a globalist-interventionist 
mindset, has contributed to bringing the world to the current conjuncture. In this essay I argue 
that although the concepts of diversity and hierarchy are both central to the broader scholarly 
discussion and to our understanding of global order, we are still missing some crucial pieces 
of the puzzle. In particular, I advocate for using the lens of class in order to expand on those 
concepts and to better capture the core crises of international order today. I will show that it is 
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not only constructivist scholars such as Acharya and Reus-Smit who have this blind spot, but 
realists and liberals as well. 
Beyond greater scholarly clarity, there is also a political question rooted in extant 
structures of power, especially in relation to the United States: Given its desire to remain 
dominant, steeped as it is in a history characterized by imperial and racialized mindsets, is the 
United States, and the broader West, able and willing to accept Global South powers on an 
equal footing? Even with its first African-American president there was little, if any, 
discernible change in U.S. foreign policy, let alone any material improvement in domestic 
racial equality.4 With President Donald Trump elected on a promise to put (white) America 
First, openly declaring whole national groups criminals, an entire continent unfit for humans, 
and a preference for Norwegians, the political space for “diversity” politics on an 
international scale remains very narrow.  
 
ACHARYA: ORGANIC INTELLECTUAL FOR NON-WESTERN ELITES? 
 
Amitav Acharya’s argument and empirical study shows clearly how Western IR has 
frequently co-opted new ideas from non-Western scholars, yet has denied the latter full 
recognition. He examines ideas such as human security (Mahbub al Haq) and responsible 
sovereignty (Francis Deng), among others, that were first developed by non-Western scholars 
and then went on to become “Western” and therefore universal. There is a major idea-shift, 
he argues, that may well be even more consequential than the global power-shift currently 
underway. At any rate, the sheer combination of the two shifts has and will change the world. 
Indeed, non-Western ideas have been changing the world for some time. Acharya, citing Eric 
Helleiner and Tom Weiss, among others, argues that “development” was not inaugurated by 
President Truman’s Point Four speech in 1952, but by the Chinese nationalist Sun Yat Sen 
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and Latin American thinkers in the 1930s who developed ideas about “dependency,” for 
example (p.198).  
Using core concepts normally attributed to Western thinkers, such as the 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and sovereignty, Acharya demonstrates with compelling 
evidence that such concepts owe a great deal to non-Western intellectuals and policymakers. 
Contrary to broad opinion, RtoP was not born in 2001. It has deep Western roots but also, 
more immediately, roots in African thought and experience. Sudan’s Francis M. Deng and 
UN secretaries-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt) and Kofi Annan (Ghana) were 
fundamental in formulating the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility,” emphasizing a 
nuanced and less threatening approach to humanitarian intervention. Rather than haughtily 
demanding that African states exercise sovereignty responsibly “or else,” as Western states 
did, Deng supported African leaders to avoid the threat of foreign intervention. He and his 
colleagues also urged African solutions to continental problems, as Western incursions 
carried the stigma of colonial-style domination. African intellectuals and practitioners were 
therefore crucial, not coincidental, to RtoP. Indeed, the co-chair of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Algeria’s Mahomed Sahoun, had 
been tortured by French colonial forces, and four other members of the commission were also 
from the Global South. Sahoun argued that in Africa, “unlike other regions, our legal systems 
have long acknowledged that in addition to individuals, groups, and leaders having rights, 
they also have reciprocal duties” (p.108).  
Acharya also makes an interesting argument on the central concept of sovereignty. All 
too often, he argues, sovereignty is viewed as a Westphalian norm extended via 
decolonization as “negative sovereignty” to the postcolonial world, focused on 
noninterference. Acharya’s fascinating archive-based analyses of the ways in which 
sovereignty actually made its way to postcolonial Africa and Asia tells a different story: 
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Third World leaders not only discussed sovereignty as something that was threatened by 
external interference but also as an empowering practice that gave agency to ways in which 
Afro-Asian powers helped shape the contours of the postwar global order itself. His analysis 
of the series of Asian-African conferences between 1947 and 1955 punctures the notion of 
postcolonial weakness, as Nehru, Sukharno, and Nkrumah, among others, constructed 
sovereignty in practice by delegitimizing multilateral security alliances such as the South-
East Asia Treaty Organization and shaped longer-term norms of Asian regionalism. 
Acharya further shows how ideational shifts toward the Global South are also 
culturally significant in the norms of conduct within international meetings, such as the Paris 
Climate Accords, and in how ASEAN members conduct business. In contrast to the 
adversarial and legalistic European Union, ASEAN, he argues, favors informality, 
inclusiveness, pragmatism, and a consensual cultural style. 
In sum, Acharya notes that the above examples indicate a radical shift in the overall 
attitude of the postcolonial states to the more powerful Western states that lead the world 
order. No longer is the approach to resist or reject, as was seen at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference and in the 1970s with the New International Economic Order’s demands for 
redistributing income, power, and wealth. Today, “the Rest” are looking to contribute 
positively to the international order. Yet “a bit of intellectual racism” appears to have 
prevented the Global South’s intellectual and practitioner pioneers from receiving due 
recognition.5 Acharya argues that the interdependencies of the West and the Rest, of the 
travel and reconstitution of ideas and norms in the modern world, combined with the re-
emergence of non-Western powers to the international stage, necessitate greater recognition, 
equity, and West-Rest cooperation.  
Acharya, in Gramscian terms, is playing the role of an organic intellectual6  for re-
emerging states’ elites, the successor generation to the postcolonial leaders who (somewhat 
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more radically) demanded a redistribution of international power in a New International 
Economic Order.7 In that regard, however, one could raise a major issue with the “non-
Westernness” of some of the more important intellectuals and practitioners he discusses. 
Francis Deng, for example, worked for an American think tank (Brookings), was educated in 
part in London and at Yale, and has taught at MIT, Johns Hopkins, and held a Distinguished 
Fellowship of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Though he has certainly brought an African 
experience to his perspectives on world problems, especially of displaced persons, he is also a 
member of the cosmopolitan elite. His African experience in itself is necessary and 
important. But there are limits to how radical a shift such greater diversity of global elites in 
the halls of power might actually offer to those, the majority of the world’s population, who 
are not so represented. 
 
REUS-SMIT: WHOSE CULTURAL DIVERSITY? 
 
In an interdisciplinary study, and in the context of rising non-Western powers, xenophobia, 
and nationalism, Reus-Smit explores “the heterogeneous cultural contexts in which diverse 
international orders have evolved” (p. ix). Such powerful dynamics motivated Reus-Smit to 
“rethink the relationship between cultural diversity and international order,” (p. x) reinforced 
by his positive personal experience of culturally-diverse environments. Making the case for 
taking culture seriously, he argues that the “practices of organizing cultural difference also 
feature in the constitution of international orders” (p. xiii). He states his claim most succinctly 
when he writes that “culture is always heterogeneous and contradictory . . . . Social 
institutions play a key role in its patterning, and . . . culture . . . shapes political orders not as a 
deeply constitutive or corrosive force but as a governance imperative” 8 (p. 5; italics mine). 
The dynamic therefore is significant, as the powerful “take extant cultural heterogeneity and 
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construct authorized forms of difference” (p.8). The question that is not addressed, however, 
flows directly from this claim: who are the power-holders who take, reshape, and authorize 
cultural difference? In the same section of the book, Reus-Smit notes that “hegemonic beliefs 
affect the nature of an order’s basic institutions,” though tellingly there is no reference to the 
origins of these “hegemonic beliefs” (p.12).  
Reus-Smit’s interesting new concept—“diversity regime”—injects into the IR 
discipline the importance of culture and cultural diversity in any full understanding of 
international orders.  In the first volume of a planned trilogy, Reus-Smit suggests that world 
history and international orders are really diversity regimes. That is, in addition to reflecting 
material power hierarchies, international orders or empires are also active organizers and 
authorizers of cultural hierarchies—of who’s in, who’s out—and their interrelations. In the 
current study, Reus-Smit spends most of his time arguing for the importance of cultural 
factors in international ordering; and over successive chapters he takes to task realism, 
constructivism, rational choice theory, and liberal internationalism for their relative neglect of 
cultural factors. At its core, the book’s main question is one of the most significant in world 
politics at this point: “Can the prevailing diversity regime accommodate new conjunctions of 
power and articulations of difference?” (p. 15).  
Liberal internationalists, as well as constructivists such as Acharya, would be more or 
less optimistic on this score. Reus-Smit, I suspect (though he does not quite explicitly state 
his conclusion), would suggest that given that diversity regimes change over time and that 
Western societies value multiculturalism over assimilation, and despite the rise of white 
identity politics, accommodation will be difficult but doable. There is faith, at a deep level, 
that the liberalism of the international order and its cornerstone states will allow it to cope 
with changing global power and cultural distributions and diffusions, and it will move to 
accommodate non-Western cultures and states. But I would suggest that while such moves 
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may empower non-Western political, cultural, and economic elites, the international order 
would remain far off from cultural, political, and economic equality given its elitist character.  
Interestingly, Reus-Smit was inspired by Acharya’s call to IR scholars, as president of 
the International Studies Association, to recognize and repair the narrowness of Western IR 
scholarship, noting that their work and ideas had excluded the majority of the world’s 
peoples. And Reus-Smit’s study, like Acharya’s own, represents an important advance 
toward that reparation. International Relations, like the world itself, is opening up (although, 
it would appear, just at a time when nationalisms, walls, and barriers are ever more 
significant).   
 
BROADENING THE BASIS OF OLIGARCHY?  
 
 In 1975, Tom Farer wrote in Foreign Affairs that demands by postcolonial leaders for a new 
international economic order could easily be sated by a few concessions to a few aspiring 
“middle class” Third World powers. Those leaders, he said, were no more interested in 
equality than Western leaders were. They simply wanted more influence for themselves and 
their fellow elites. Giving them a small measure of inclusion, Farrer argued, would be akin to 
how big industrialists handled upsurges of worker movements in the 1890s’ United States—
concessions to effectively divide and weaken.9  
Farrer was writing about the liberation-generation of postcolonial leaders, not the 
leaders of Brazil, China, or India of today. The latter have largely embraced the Washington 
consensus, exhibit little emancipatory rhetoric let alone ideologies, and appear today as 
firmer supporters of capitalist globalization than President Trump. They preside over 
societies that are deeply unequal and are therefore witnessing massive social and political 
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unrest, a decline in the legitimacy of established political institutions, and the emergence of 
new and unpredictable forces. 
Surveying the current landscape, Acharya and Reus-Smit, having embarked on their 
separate but related projects, have produced studies that open minds and ask pressing new 
questions. At precisely the moment of global power shifts, and the re-emergence of 
civilizational approaches demanding separation and hierarchies, two leading IR scholars have 
produced an urgent call to see the world differently—to recognize the contributions of the 
non-West, its influence on key concepts and international norms, as well as the significance 
of culture and cultural diversity-ordering regimes. Though related, their outlooks do diverge 
somewhat. Acharya predicts and welcomes the full flowering of a nascent “multiplex world” 
system of deep interdependencies and networks that, he hopes, will break down West/non-
West dichotomies and unequal power relations as a way out of the current crisis of liberal 
international order. Reus-Smit, for his part, welcomes the flowering of a similar diversity and 
diffusion of power but wonders if the United States/West would or could fully accept non-
Western demands for cultural equality in a new diversity regime. 
What both Acharya and  Reus-Smit neglect, however, is class, and class inequalities 
which are re-emerging as  potent ideas and political forces after spending so long in the 
shadow of the Soviet collapse and the liberal triumphalist celebration of the end of history, 
not to mention the domination of identity politics. Class and class conflict may be the deeper 
forces, the undertow, while xenophobic politics and identity politics more generally remain 
important. Sexism and racism, for example, remain major barriers to recognition, dignity, and 
opportunity. The identity politics movement also has a tendency to divide loyalties and class 
attachments, cutting across and defusing class conflicts and class-based politics. It began as a 
movement that argued that class is at the core of power distributions, but further stipulated 
that race and gender were additional double and triple burdens for workers of color or 
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women workers and therefore should be recognized in the demands of movements for 
equality. It has become a series of autonomous movements that cut across and undermine 
solidarities rooted in class relations.10 Nevertheless, great inequalities of income, wealth, and 
therefore power persist across West and non-West alike, and this fact is giving rise to a new 
generation of class-focused thinkers and politicians.  
In the absence of class politics and conflicts, we see the limitations of the new vantage 
points that Acharya and Reus-Smit have opened up. As the future British Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden noted in 1928 in the House of Commons: “We do not have democracy, nor 
will we ever have it. What we have done in all progress of reform and evolution is to broaden 
the basis of oligarchy.”11 The worry is that after much struggle we may well achieve the kind 
of multiplex world order or diversity regime that Acharya and Reus-Smit desire—one in 
which the true contributions of West and non-West are recognized, synthesized, and 
celebrated; in which cultural relations and hierarchies are re-envisioned and articulated; and 
yet one in which serious problems of class inequality persist.  
In the works under consideration here, hierarchy is principally understood as unequal 
relations between West and non-West, with a case made for breaking down the dichotomy 
through recognition of the contributions made by the non-West to “Western” ideas and 
norms, as Acharya demonstrates. This hierarchy can be diminished, he argues, by fully 
recognizing the aforementioned diversity of thought, opening the way to a “multiplex world” 
of mutual recognition and diffused power. Yet, what Acharya is actually arguing for is a 
more inclusive hierarchy, not against hierarchy per se.  His prescription gives little 
recognition to another increasingly significant aspect of global hierarchy—inequalities of 
income, wealth, and political power. These  inequalities within states/societies are powerful 
drivers of political challenges from below, yet both Acharya and Reus-Smit appear to 
recognize only horizontal inequality between states/cultures/civilizations under the banner of 
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diversity.  The authors’ perspective overlooks growing movements worldwide that have 
recently created greater political space for anti-elitism and opposition to class inequality. This 
has come in the form of right-wing populist anti-elitism resulting in the election of Donald 
Trump, UK voters choosing to exit the European Union, as well as the rise of left-wing 
political movements, leading to the 2015 election of Jeremy Corbyn to leader of the British 
Labour Party, Bernie Sanders’s 2016 presidential campaign, and support for the French 
“yellow vests” movement. Notably, President Trump’s populist rhetoric—beyond a 
psychological wage – a feel-good factor for swathes of white voters in having recaptured the 
presidency from cosmopolitan elites like Barack Obama -has yielded little material benefit to 
ordinary Americans, while corporate tax cuts and deregulation supported by his 
administration have exacerbated standing inequalities. Nevertheless, attitudinal shifts against 
elite politics, and a greater movement toward socialist thinking in the United States,12 suggest 
the popular-political terrain may be fertile for radical change movements. 
 
In order to place class more centrally in our study of the international politics of the 
present, I suggest we pay more attention to the works of Antonio Gramsci and of Karl 
Kautsky. Specifically, I take Gramsci’s concept of a “historic bloc” (effectively a coalition of 
cross-class interests that define the core hegemonic political, economic, and ideological 
concepts and regimes of a particular historical era) and internationalize it by bringing states, 
international public and private organizations, domestic civil society, and elite private 
institutions across the West-Rest dichotomy into closer connection. This is to “Gramscianise” 
Acharya’s multiplex world by rooting it in domestic class-based inequalities. For all its 
promise of diversity, Acharya’s multiplex world looks like elites from the West-Rest sharing 
power and providing mutual recognition, while presiding over unequal corporate-dominated 
societies. Gramscian class politics suggests that while demands for diversity diminish one 
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type of hierarchy, such change does not address rebellions from the working and middle 
classes, the energy for which, at the moment, is largely being harnessed by the Right.  
While Gramsci paid greater attention to domestic politics (and most subsequent 
Gramscians applied his ideas largely in discussions of Western interstate and economic 
relationships), Kautsky helps us to understand international politics as being rooted in class 
conflict that has resulted in what he describes as inter-ruling class collaboration, or “ultra-
imperialism.” Contra Lenin, Kautsky argues that just as multinational corporations manage 
competition by forming cartels across states and economies, so too do ruling classes and 
states ally or cooperate to limit their conflicts (preventing great power wars) and maximize 
their class positions. If we combine ultra-imperialism with Gramsci’s (international) historic 
bloc, we can understand international organizations, states, and their elite and civil societies 
all as elements of the elite global upper-class.  
By thus incorporating class into our analysis, we might more clearly recognize how deeply 
class inequalities are embedded in political party and elite policy agendas and great power 
strategies. This clearly has important implications for scholars who argue more narrowly for 
West-Rest diversity recognition and  for reform of the mindsets and agendas of U.S. foreign 
policy elite. For both liberals and realists, the answer lies in recognizing varying kinds of 
restraint.  
 
THE REALIST CRITIQUE; CRITIQUING THE REALISTS 
 
Acharya and Reus-Smit are not alone in overlooking class as a key driver in international 
order. Recently there has been a surge in deep and scathing assessments of U.S. liberal 
foreign policy elites by some influential liberal and realist scholars alike. As we have seen 
above, Tony Smith appreciates but critiques American liberal hegemony. Equally 
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interestingly, Stephen Walt and other realists such as John Mearsheimer and Christopher 
Layne have launched withering critiques of the U.S. foreign policy establishment that they 
argue has led the United States to one disaster after another since the 1990s and, unwittingly, 
built the platform for the rise of President Donald Trump’s America First-ism. Those realist 
critiques, recently invigorated by new research programs funded by the Charles Koch 
Foundation that works in tandem with the Trump Republican Party, superficially echo13 the 
critical political economy–oriented analysis of Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Naná de Graaff, 
who connect the very U.S. foreign policy elites Walt and Layne lambast to corporate elite 
networks.14 The advantages of Apeldoorn and de Graaf’s work, however, is that it both points 
out some of realism’s deficiencies and offers a way to evaluate Acharya’s  and Reus-Smit’s 
suggestions for moving forward.   
In all of these critiques, the class question hangs unanswered over the IR scholars of 
U.S. power, both liberal and realist. They see that the United States has waged war after 
disastrous war over the past quarter century  under the banner of improving the world—
spreading democracy, building nations, promoting and protecting human rights, fighting 
terrorism. For Smith, it is pure imperial hubris, “end of history” triumphalism in need of a 
strong dose of the philosophy of restraint. But they cannot see the relevance of class; their 
theories retain deep faith in American democracy and its historic promise. As I will show, 
however, their critiques of the system perpetuate a narrative that relies on global affairs being 
determined by a largely class-based international foreign policy elite.  
To realists bent on exposing the “great delusions” and the “hell of good intentions”15  
of American power, the “cant” of the democratic peace, the way forward for a foreign policy 
elite wedded to militarized liberal hegemony is strategic restraint. Receiving research funds 
from the Charles Koch Foundation, among others, realists appear to depart from analyzing 
the structural sources of state behavior to analyzing the domestic politics of foreign policy. 
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The foreign policy elite, Walt argues, means well but is entrenched and self-perpetuating, 
rewarded regardless of results, and has, up until Trump, reigned supreme. Trump primarily 
threatens their program with his rhetorical attacks on core institutions and relationships built 
over decades by the liberal establishment—NATO, the UN, EU, and WTO, among others. 
His personal style—racialized, disrespectful, aggressive— and his dismissal of the concerns 
of other states under the banner of “America First” undermines American credibility. The 
moral authority—to the degree that it exists—at the heart of the liberal hegemonic project has 
little or no role to play in the embrace of the “principled realism” of Trump’s “America First” 
national security strategy. Though Trump tapped into popular discontent with unsuccessful 
and never-ending post-9/11 wars and questioned liberal hegemonic strategies, Walt criticizes 
him for policy incoherence and his inability to follow through. But Trump has opened the 
way for realists to come to the fore with a grand strategy of restraint and offshore balancing.  
Putting the pros and cons of strategic restraint aside, it would appear that the realists 
in question have had to soften their attachments to what are considered key elements of 
realist theory—including its central tenet that the structure of the international system largely 
determines the strategies of states. Walt and Mearsheimer have both had to move toward 
domestic elites’ power to explain the “wrong” choices made by the liberal hegemonic 
establishment. This represents a major departure, first signaled by Walt and Mearsheimer’s 
study of the Israel lobby in U.S. foreign policy back in 2007. 
In addition, it is quite remarkable that leading realists accept at face value liberal 
policymakers’ own claims as to the motivations behind their strategies. That is, liberal 
hegemonic elites are accepted as genuinely and benignly promoting democracy, human 
rights, and other liberal values. The question of the character of U.S. political democracy 
itself also remains unquestioned; indeed, Mearsheimer lauds it as the best possible system, 
without indicating any of its deep-seated problems that are more evident given the crises of 
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current U.S. government and politics. This elides the thorny problem that state policymakers’ 
motivations are explicable, in theory, as a defense of elite and class-based interests justified 
and legitimized by liberal ideology. This is no loss to those who write on elite theory, of 
course, who welcome the boost that the conversion of such leading realists provides to a 
theory and approach that has been making a comeback over the past several years. 
However the above discussion is concluded, the fact remains that realists have made a 
major advance in explaining how American power works. The significance of entrenched 
elites, which was a major research field across the social sciences from the 1950s to the 
1970s, is back. Yet realists are still just skimming the surface of entrenched power by 
focusing only on elites. Apeldoorn’s and de Graaff’s studies of elite networks and U.S. grand 
strategy push further, bringing us back to class issues. They situate these elites in the various 
corporate sectors of U.S. political economy, recognizing them as central to a whole complex 
of power that also includes universities, think tanks, foundations and the major state 
departments and agencies.  
Approached in this way, with class as central, we may conceive of world politics and 
international orders as complex systems featuring political, economic, military, and cultural 
hierarchies, driven by a variety of political-economic and cultural factors, rooted in corporate 
class power that features interconnected networks of intellectuals, think tanks, media, and 
state agencies. A model that casts international orders, interstate alliances, and civil society 
networks across boundaries, rooted in state-backed corporate power, better reflects the actual 
core drivers of global politics: a class-based system of elites largely managing change top-
down to reflect the necessities of the uneven development of relative power across the 
world’s states and other major actors.  
Neither Western recognition of non-Western elites’ contributions to ideas nor a 
diversity regime that is more accommodating of Eastern and other elite cultures nor the 
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urging of liberal-imperial or offshore balancing and strategic restraint is going to result in 
sufficient change to address real-world dynamics that are producing and reproducing 
inequality, hierarchy, and the concentrations of wealth and political power that they enable. 
There is growing social pressure, just beneath the surface of most societies and reflected in 
national and international politics, that threatens to break out in extreme levels of social 
fracturing and political violence. This is widely recognized not just by Marxists but by the 
World Economic Forum and other corporate groups and analysts.16  
Returning to Acharya and Reus-Smit, however, it is testament to the health of the IR 
discipline that we are having such a breadth of debate that is more inclusive of radical ideas. 
It suggests that the ideas themselves are good ones and worth debating. But it also speaks 
volumes about where the world stands today: anxious, volatile, and fearful for the future. The 
old ideas and ways are sufficient neither to make sense of our problems nor to help navigate 
the present and future. The world appears to be at an inflection point. As Antonio Gramsci 
noted a century ago, “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” Therefore, 
he continues, “When such crises occur, the immediate situation becomes delicate and 
dangerous, because the field is open for violent solutions, for the activities of unknown 
forces, represented by charismatic ‘men of destiny’.”17  
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